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ABSTRACT 
Measures of price behavior within potentially efficient markets, rela-
tive to Walras' theory of tatonnement, are: (1) increased frequency and 
diminished magnitude of price changes, (2) increased short-term plus de-
creased long-term price variability, and (3) increased correlation between 
price and market conditions. These measures were applied to three electronic 
markets. 
Pricing Efficiency as a Perceived Marketing Problem 
Over the past fifty years, pronounced structural changes have occurred 
in markets for agricultural products. Farm production units have become 
larger and more specialized. Buyers of farm products have relocated from 
central cities that were railroad terminals to country points that are closer 
to farms and ranches from which they obtain supply [USDA]. 
These changes have facilitated a transition in agricultural marketing 
from public to private trading [Packers and Stockyards]. At one time, termi-
nal wholesale public markets were the nexus of trade for farm products, where 
trading was regulated by published rules. Even when prices were privately 
negotiated between buyers' and sellers' agents, the large assembly of commod-
ities traded in the terminals allowed all participants to satisfactorily moni-
tor the market and to obtain accurate and complete price information. Since 
observers assumed that the large volume of commodities traded in the market 
accurately reflected existing supply-and-demand relationships, few questions 
surfaced concerning the efficiency of prices established in these terminal 
1/ 
markets.-
Agricultural marketing became increasingly private as it moved from the 
central wholesale markets to the country, which was concurrent with the re-
structuring of agricultural production and processing. In many cases, prices 
reported on terminal markets became reference prices for privately negotiated 
sales that occurred between farmers and buyers. As an increasing share of 
all transactions became private, however, the base for trades at public mar-
kets became increasing "narrow". This narrowness caused market observers to 
question whether reported public market prices accurately represented true 
marketwide conditions and whether prices established by private traders using 
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off-market relationships accurately reflected true market va1ues [Hayenga, 
Johnson and Marion]. 
These questions became even more forceful as formulas were negotiated 
between farmers and buyers which standardized, for an extended period of time, 
the off-market relationship between actual transaction prices and some base 
price quote. These formulas potentially remove from individual transactions 
the fine tuning process of price adjustment which is necessary for the most 
efficient matching of market supplies with demands and for the establishment 
of accurate product values (efficient prices). Resource misallocations then 
occur in response to the formulation of inaccurate or misleading transaction 
prices through private trades. 
While the concern over pricing inefficiency and resource misallocation 
in agricultural markets is widespread, little concrete evidence of the magni-
tude of such distortions has been revealed [Hayenga]. The purposes of this 
paper are, therefore, to examine the concept of pricing efficiency relative to 
optimal resource allocation, to examine means of measuring pricing efficiency 
in this context, to apply those measures to actual price behavior in elec-
tronic markets, and to suggest ways of empirically validating these measure-
ments. 
A Working Concept of Pricing Efficiency 
Efficient prices are viewed as those which yield the Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources. Theoretically, these are prices that evolve from a 
pricing mechanism which consistently and rapidly yields the competitive 
equilibrium price in a competitively structured market. 
Smith has shown, for example, in reporting the results of more than 1,000 
pricing experiments that prices in a double auction consistently and rapidly 
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converge to the competitive equilibrium level which results from supply and 
demand functions established by experimenters. Even though neither buyers 
nor sellers know the true equilibrium price in the experimental markets, a 
double auction pricing procedure rapidly establishes price at the true com-
petitive equilibrium point. Smith's results show that other price establish-
ment procedures, such as English or Dutch auctions and sealed bids, pro-
vide less assurance of arriving at the competitive equilibrium price. Others 
who replicated Smith's work and those who pursued similar but unique pioneer-
ing efforts collaborated his findings [Plott]. 
Thus, this concept of pricing efficiency (a pricing system in which prices 
converge rapidly and consistently toward a competitive equilibrium) seems 
consistent with actual pricing behavior that has been observed in laboratory 
or experimental settings. It also is consistent with the achievement of the-
oretically expected price levels in markets that are competitively and monopo-
listically structured [Plott]. 
Measuring Pricing Efficiency 
While the evidence compiled by Smith and reported by Plott reveals that 
an assessment of pricing efficiency is possible in experimental situations 
where the true competitive equilibirum price is known ~ priori, this is of 
little help in real world situations where the competitive equilibrium price 
is not known.1/ How does one determine, for example, if the price reported from 
an existing market is equal to, or is even converging toward, the true com-
petitive equilibrium price? Market-wide supply and demand functions are gen-
erally not known before (or even after) pricing actually occurs, thus, there 
is no known competitive equilibrium price with which to compare actual market 
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prices. Furthermore, markets are dynamic which means that supply and demand 
functions are continuously shifting and establishing new equilibrium points. 
Knowledge of marketwide supply and demand functions does not necessar-
ily reveal the appropriate market equilibrium price at the conclusion of 
trading. This is so because markets are dynamic; thus it is neithe~ empir-
ically possible nor theoretically adequate to compare actual market prices 
to the true competitive equilibrium price for a market. What then, are the 
alternatives for evaluating efficient pricing mechanisms? 
One approach is to compare the behavior of prices during the price es-
tablishment period in a market with that which would theoretically or con-
ceptually generated competitive equilibrium prices. In such an analysis, if 
actual price behavior is consistent with that which logic suggests would cause 
prices to converge rapidly toward the competitive equilibrium (assuming a com-
petitively structured market), then the pricing system would be judged to be 
efficient. On the other hand, lack of consistent price behavior would be con-
strued as evidence of pricing inefficiency. 
Traditional micro-economic theory has little to say about price behav-
ior per se. Traditional theory assumes an efficient pricing procedure and 
deals largely with the outcome or the equilibirum price level [Edgeworth]. 
Walrus, writing before Edgeworth, utilized economic theory to investi-
gate pricing behavior patterns. He explicitly recognized that, as the utility 
of any product or resource increases or decreases for one or more of the 
traders, or as the quantity in the hands of one or more holders increases or 
decreases, the equilibrium price, through a groping or "tatonnement" process, 
rises when the demand is greater than the off er or falls when the off er is 
greater than the demand. Such an equilibrium price remains constant in a 
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stationary market in which utilities and quantities possessed by the traders 
are expressed once and remain fixed thereafter. The equilibrium fluctuates 
in the dynamic market of the real world in which utilities and quantities 
continuously change. 
Viewed in the above way, variability in individual transaction pricing 
indicates the level of groping that occurs within a market for the elusive 
but true equilibrium price. Assuming that the process of Walrasian tatonne-
ment is indicative of pricing efficiency, the relevant empirical question is, 
how can the groping or tatonnement process be measured? And, the question for 
logic is, what level(s) of price variability represents optimum price behav-
ior or pricing efficiency? 
Three measures have been devised to answer the empirical question. All 
three seem logically appealing and include: (1) frequency and magnitude of 
price change, (2) long and short run price variability, and (3) correlation 
with previous price. We are not yet prepared to argue that all three measures 
are necessary for the assessment of pricing efficiency, nor are we p~epared to 
argue that any or all of these measures are necessarily sufficient. None-
theless, our investigations do suggest that they offer merit for further con-
sideration. 
The frequency and magnitude of price change is measured as the change in 
price between market transactions. Logic suggests that, more frequent price 
changes of smaller magnitude are indicative of more active tatonnement price 
establishment than is the case when transaction prices adjust less frequently 
and in larger increments. Thus, over the course of the market exchange, very 
frequent, minute price changes represent a price establishment process which 
is more sensitive (i.e., more efficient) in detecting changes in perceived 
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utilities and the quantities possessed by actual and potential market par-
ticipants. 
Short and long run price variability is measured as the change in price 
through time in response to changing market conditions. Using an extension 
of the efficient-market argument, logic again suggests that frequent, minute 
price changes in any short time period (such as a day for a daily market or 
a week for a weekly market) are indicative of an efficient pricing system 
which captures changes in marketing conditions through time. Prices should 
change more of ten and in smaller quantities for an efficient market relative 
to price changes in a more inefficient market. 
Similarly, if the groping process associated with increased short term 
price variability is effective in establishing accurate transaction prices, 
then there should be fewer misallocations of resources (reduced cyclical in-
stability) in the longer term. Thus, long term price variability throughout 
the production cycle should be lower in markets with the more efficient pric-
ing system. The combination of higher short term and lower long term price 
variabilities constitutes our second measure of relative pricing efficiency. 
The third measure is price correlation. It is argued that in markets 
where improved tatonnement prevails there should be a decrease in correlation 
between previous and current transaction price and an increase in correlation 
between current transaction price and other supply-demand parameters. If the 
price establishment procedure is efficient in tracking on-going changes in 
market conditions, the dependence of current price on past price should de-
crease, while the dependence of price on changes in supply-demand conditions 
should increase. 
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Empirical Evidence 
These pricing efficiency measures have been applied to prices reported 
from three electronic markets.1/ The pricing results from these markets are 
used in this analysis for several reasons. First, electronic markets are 
highly competitive, and therefore meet the competitive market structure 
criterion that is theoretically necessary to assure convergence of market 
prices with Pareto optimal equilibrium levels. Second, much of the litera-
ture on electronic markets indicates that they promote a significant improve-
ment in pricing efficiency relative to privately negotiated markets and other 
less competitive marketing systems [Henderson]. And third, our direct in-
volvement with electronic marketing experiments generated substantial trading 
data, including individual transaction prices. 
All three measures, however, have not been applied to all sets of avail-
able data. The rationale for the price correlation measure was not developed 
until analysis had been completed on the electronic egg market and on butcher 
hog prices, generated by the Ontario Pork Producers Marketin~ Board. The price 
correlation analysis has been applied only to price data obtained in HAMS, 
which operated in Ohio and in surrounding states from November 1980 through 
June 1981. The other two measures, frequency of price change among trans-
actions and price variability in the short and long run time, have been 
applied to all three sets of trading data. 
The frequency and magnitude of price change and the long and short run 
price variation measures for egg prices are shown in Table 1, while these 
same measures comparing Ontario teletype auction hog prices with private 
treaty prices are shown in Table 2. The results of analyzing price behavior 
in the HAMS electronic market, along with comparable terminal and direct pri-
- 8 -
TABLE 1. Egg Price Behavior Comparisons: Private Trading Versus An Electronic 
Market, Egg Clearinghouse~ Inc. 
Price Change Frequency '}_/ 
Average Price Change ii 
Short-Run Price Variation 2I 
L R P . v . . 61 ong- un rice ariation -
Source: See Henderson et al., 1979, p. 13 
Private ll 
Trading -
0.481 
2.32 
2.19 
8.46 
1974-78 
Electronic21 
Market -
0.687 
2.18 
2.47 
8.43 
!/ Prices for grade A large white eggs in private trade quoted by Urner Barry 
Publications, Inc. 
'!:_I Daily average prices for Class I (large) gradable nest run eggs on Egg Clear-
inghouse, Inc. converted to grade A large white equivalent prices. 
31 Calculated by dividing the number of changes in reported prices by the total 
number of reported prices. 
ii Cents per dozen. 
51 Standard deviation in four week moving average of daily prices. 
61 Standard deviation in daily prices over entire observation period. 
TABLE 2. Hog Price Behavior Comparisons: Private Trading Versus An Electronic 
Market, Ontario Pork Producers Marketing Board 
Price Change Frequency '}_/ 
Average Price Change ii 
Short-Run Price Variation 21 
L R P . v . . 6/ ong- un rice ariation -
Source: Henderson, 1980, p. 37 
Private ll 
Trading -
0.85 
0.73 
1.50 
7.48 
1979 
Electronic21 
Market -
1.00 
0.94 
2.11 
6.74 
l/ Prices for live U.S. No. 1 market hogs purchased by private treaty by Eastern 
Order Buyers, converted to carcass weight equivalent, with heads. 
21 Daily average prices for Canadian index 100 hog carcasses, with heads, paid 
by meatpackers on the teletype auction operated by the Ontario Pork Producers 
Marketing Board. 
31 Calculated by dividing the number of changes in reported prices by the total 
number of reported prices. 
(.., !:_I Dollars per hundred weight. 
51 Average monthly standard deviation in daily prices. 
§_/ Standard deviation in daily prices over entire observation period. 
(..., 
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TABLE 3. Hog Price Behavior Comparisons: Private Trading and Terminal Market 
Versus an Electronic Market, HAMS 
1980-81 
Electronic11 Terrnina121 Direct 3/ Market - Market - Trading 
Price Change Frequency !!_/ 98.6 88.4 85.0 
5/ Average Price Change - 0.51 0.66 0.55 
Short-Run Price Variation ~/ 0.49 0.57 0.49 
Long-Run Price Variation J_/ 2.82 2.82 2.83 
Correlation with Previous Price 8/ .967 • 981 • 979 
Source: Rhodus et al., 1983, p. 26 
l/ Prices for U.S. No. 1 and 2 market hogs on the Hog Accelerated Marketing 
System, operated experimentally by Producers Livestock Association, Columbus, 
Ohio. 
21 Prices for U.S. No. 1 and 2 market hogs at the Peoria (Illinois) terminal 
livestock market. 
3/ 
4/ 
5/ 
6/ 
J_/ 
8/ 
Prices for U.S. No. 1 and 2 market hogs in the Indiana direct trade. 
Calculated by dividing the number of changes in daily average prices by the 
number of days in which trading occurred. 
Dollars per hundred weight. 
Average weekly standard deviation in average daily prices. 
Standard deviation in average daily prices over entire observation 
period (November 1980 - June 1981). 
Partial correlation coefficient between current daily average price and 
the previous day's average price from "best fit" multiple regression 
models for each market that include several variables that measure changes 
in market supply and demand conditions. 
. 
e I 
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vate treaty markets, including the measurement of price correlation, are 
included in Table 3. 
The results are consistent among the three measures and with our 
a priori expectations, with minor exceptions. These results show for 
electronic markets, which are expected to be more price efficient, more 
frequent price changes than do the comparable less efficient price system(s). 
In all observations but one, the magnitude of average price change is also 
lower in the electronic market. 
The short run price variation in the price-efficient electronic markets 
is likewise consistently below those in comparable markets with one exception: 
HAMS-Indiana direct comparison where no difference is detected. Consistent 
behavior is found in the corollary measure in that there is a decline in the 
• 
long run price variation for the more efficient electronic market • 
All differences are statistically significant, with the exception of 
the long run price variation comparisons between the HAMS, Peoria terminal, 
and Indiana direct markets. Available data limited observation to a 7 month 
period for these comparisons. This is not sufficient for accurate assessment 
of long run price behavior, given the 4 year nature of the typical hog cycle. 
No conclusion can, therefore, be drawn from the long run price variation in 
these markets. The comparison, however, does not reveal any evidence that 
would contradict the decline in long run price variation demonstrated in the 
other markets in which more appropriate long run time periods were observed. 
The third measure, correlation with previous price, also demonstrates 
results entirely consistent with our logic and theoretical expectations . 
• 
.. 
• 
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Differences between the HAMS, Peoria terminal, and Indiana direct markets 
(Table 3) demonstrate increased sensitivity of individual transaction prices 
to factors other than previous transaction price in the electronic market. 
These results show greater price sensitivity to a range of variables that 
represent on-going changes in market conditions. 
These observations strongly suggest that, when viewed collectively, these 
measures yield results that are consistent with ~ priori reasoning and theo-
retical expectations of efficient pricing. We are encouraged that these are 
useful empirical measures in making evaluations of pricing efficiency in mar-
kets where the true competitive equilibrium price is not known. 
Limitations and Alternatives 
The most pronounced limitation of our analysis is that there is no assur-
ance that the prices in a market which demonstrate the measured characteris-
tices associated with pricing efficiency do, in fact, converge toward the true 
competitive equilibrium. In real markets, the true competitive equilibrium 
price is not known. Following the Walrasian logic, that price is elusive, and 
efficient pricing behavior is that which constantly chases the elusive equi-
librium. While our research reveals evidence of pricing behavior that is con-
sistent with what we expect in price-efficient markets, we do not have evidence 
that the prices actually resulted from this behavior are efficient prices. 
Smith and Plott, however, have shown that pricing experiments can be 
conducted to determine if efficient prices are established in markets where 
the competitive equilibrium price is known to the experimenter before the 
fact. A logical extension of our research is, therefore, to establish a 
series of pricing experiments. In these experiments, the equilibrium price 
would be determined a priori and various pricing procedures, using a combi-
• 
• 
• 
• 
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nation of both efficient and inefficient pricing systems, would be used for 
price establishment through simulated trading. Actual pricing behavior would 
then be monitored and price behavior variables would be measured accordingly. 
A correlation then could be made between measures of efficient pricing be-
havior and the extent to which prices in the various pricing systems converged 
to the established competitive equilibrium. A high correlation would be 
strong validation that these empirical measures are useful for the assess-
ment of pricing efficiency in real world markets • 
Footnotes 
.!/Many of the commodities were also traded in auctions where results 
were readily observable to all participants. 
±/Plott concludes with the statement that the ultimate usefulness of 
experimental work cannot be determined until the experimental findings are 
verified by closely examining price behavior in industries. 
]/The electronic markets include the Egg Clearinghouse, Inc. 
[Schrader}; a teletype auction operated by the Ontario Pork Producers 
Marketing Board [Engelman} and an experimental electronic market for 
Slaughter Hogs (HAMS) [Baldwin] • 
.. ' 
• 
• 
.. 
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